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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

L42515

ARMED FORCES AND NATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA

by

Lee, Sang Gi

...

December 1988

Thesis Advisor:	Ronald A. Weitzman
Co-Advisor	James E. Suchan

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Armed Forces and National Development  
in Korea

by

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Major, Republic of Korea Army  
B.S., Korea Military Academy, 1980

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

During the last thirty years, Korean society has experienced a significant increase in the role, influence, responsibility, and expertise of the military. The role and contribution of the military has been extensive for the nation-building of the newly independent country, the maintenance of national security, economic and social development, and to the cultivation of nationalism and national spirit.

Even though the military is composed of all strata of society and contains the same ideology and values as the civilian population, there still exists a communication and understanding gap between the military and civilian population.

In order to decrease this gap and enhance mutual understanding, the military must take active effort to improve public relations through an increasing awareness of what the military does in Korea, and how it supports civilian population activities.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In many of the new countries that have emerged following World War II, the military has played a vital role in nation building. As a revolutionary force, various military groups have contributed to the disintegration of traditional political order; as a stabilizing force, they have kept countries from falling prey to communist rule; and as a modernizing force, they have met popular demands for social change and have provided administrative and technological skills to the civilian sector of countries in which such skills are scarce.

The Korean armed forces were a longed-for-dream during the 36 years of *Japanese colonial domination (1919-1945)* and, as such, embodied the hope for independence and national sovereignty. Right after liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the Korean people were required to establish both military and political institutions at the same time.

From the beginning, the Korean armed forces had to overcome the ideological clash of the *Korean War (1950-1953)* and to participate in politics through military revolution of 1961. This revolution provided the impetus for progress and the modernization that followed. Subsequent participation in the *Vietnam War* significantly improved the capability of the Korean armed forces and earned their status as one of the most modern institutions in the country. Among Korean institutions, the military stands unique. No other cohesive and mature group approaches its size of some 600,000 men. The military has been subjected to a consistent discipline and, since the *Korean War*, to a national educational process.

No civilian group or institution has come close to it in the development of a definite and fairly administered career service.

The confidence of the Korean military was at work in the *Military Revolution* in 1961. The result of the revolution was the establishment of military hegemony over Korean government and politics. However strong armed forces were unusual in the context of the past several centuries of Korean history. The 1961 revolution was the first time in eight hundred years that the military had been cast in a renovating role.

The role of the Korean military has increased remarkably in Korean society since 1961. Lovell describes that the enormous capacity of the Republic of Korea military is influencing almost all aspects of Korean politics [Ref. 1:p. 25].

The primary mission of any national military force is to provide for the national security and to be prepared to wage successful battle. In modern society, however, the military often has the secondary but still vital role of contributing to national development. In the case of Korea, the military has the double mission of playing a central role of contributing to the nation's development while also deterring war from breaking out as a foremost line of defense against the North Korean Communists.

As Julian Corbett warned, the armed forces must meet whatever changes social and technological development require, otherwise they will be overturned [Ref. 2:p. 46]. In this connection, this study focuses on surveying the role of the Korean military in national development as well as on examining the interdependence between the military and civilian society in Korea. The intent of this study is to

examine how much impact and influence the Korean military has had on national development and to demonstrate the extent to which the Korean military has contributed to that development. Also, this study will suggest some ideas for better civilian-military relations in the future.

## II. METHOD OF STUDY AND ORGANIZATION

The basic methodology of this study is *descriptive*. This methodology involves the collection and evaluation of facts related to the past. This paper is not a comparative study nor an attempt at hypothesis testing. This paper evaluates the contribution of the Korean military organization to the development of the national development by using the method of specific illustration.

Since the military is one of the biggest consumer groups in Korean society in peacetime, it is impossible to evaluate comprehensively its productivity or efficiency. Therefore, this study will be limited to a historical and descriptive approach.

A major problem in assessing the Korean military impact on national development is limited resources which describe the role of the Korean military and the contribution to national development. Furthermore, although available, some classified materials and some sensitive political matters will not be allowed to be made public.

This study will be organized in the following manner. *Chapter III* examines the role of the military as a modernizing agent in the development of some countries. In many of the nations which were born shortly after the *Second World War* like Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia, the military has played central roles in nation building. Also in the West, the military has played a important role in providing technical skills in the process of industrial development. In this context, this chapter examines the role of the military as a modernizing agents in these countries.

*Chapter IV* reviews the Korean military tradition since old dynasties and describes the history of Korean military from its embryonic stage to becoming one of the influential groups in Korean society as a result of the success of the military revolution in 1961.

*Chapter V* discusses the societal role of the Korean military. In the context of development, the Korean military stands as the most modern institution. Also, it has made an enormous contribution to Korean nation building by functioning as a national educational institute for young recruits throughout the country. This chapter also deals with the role of the military elite in economic development in the 1960's.

In *Chapter VI*, contributions of Korean military to the civilian area are discussed. The military has rendered immense service to the civilian sector in various areas of Korean society. The Korean military has been successful in contributing to national development in the following areas: civic support, technical manpower and development, medical science, and general manpower production. The military has achieved success in these area by using its advanced technical skills, managerial ability, and its resources. These contributions are specifically illustrated in this chapter.

And finally *Chapter VII* suggests some ideas for a better civilian-military relationship in the future. Despite the immense contributions to the nation by the Korean military, there has been a rising concern about the status of the military in Korean society. In this concluding chapter, I'd like to suggest few ideas to enhance harmony and cooperation between the military and civilian population.



### III. THE MILITARY AS MODERNIZING AGENTS

In many of the nations which were born shortly after the *Second World War*, Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia for example, the military has played central roles in nation building. These countries may be considered representatives of the newly independent nations of South-east Asia. These countries are probably the best examples in which to observe the military as a modernizing and westernizing influence.

The Burmese Army, for example, in addition to its engineer and signal corps, has special sections on chemical warfare and psychological warfare as well as a historical and archaeological section. In fact, all the new armies have taken an active part in introducing specialized training schools and advanced techniques of personnel management and procurement [Ref. 3:p. 77]. The military in these developing countries has provided the primary impetus for modernization and development, while also striving to create internal harmony.

Just as the military represents an industrialized organization, so must those who have been trained within it learn skills and habits of mind which would be of value in other industrial organizations.

In the West, armies in developed countries have played a very important role in providing technical training and even direct services in the process of industrial development. After World War II, the *German Army* trained large numbers of non-commissioned officers who performed important functions in the German steel mills and in other industries. In the *United States Army Engineers* played a central role

in the whole development of the West. After the Civil War, army veterans provided considerable amounts of skills and knowledge which, when combined with the influx of immigrants, provided a basis for much of its industrial development.

In Latin America, the *Brazilian Army* has played an important part in opening the interior, in promoting the natural sciences, and in protecting the Indian population. In Asia, too, we can see much the same story being enacted now. Before the war the compulsory training in the *Japanese Army* provided the whole society with increasing reservoirs of manpower which contributed directly to the development of an industrial society. Army veterans in *India* have also played an important role not only in low-level industrial jobs but also in managerial positions. Finally in *Malaysia* and the *Philippines* the army has been the main instrument for training people in operating and maintaining motor vehicles and other forms of machinery. [Ref. 3:p. 82]

Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the military is that it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they must identify with a larger political self. They learn that they stand in some definite relationship to a national community. In this sense the army experience tends to be a politicizing experience [Ref. 3:p. 96]. Even if recruits are not given explicit training in political matters, they are likely to learn that events in their society are determined by human decisions and not just by chance and fate. Thus even aside from any formal training in patriotism, the recruit is likely to achieve some awareness of the political dimensions of his society. It is therefore not surprising

that in many of the newly emerging countries veterans have had appreciable political influence even after only limited military experience.

#### IV. KOREA AND MILITARY

The current role of the military in every aspect of Korean society seems to be far more influential than meets the eye. Given the military's size, to highly trained manpower, and to sophisticated new weapon systems, the scope and magnitude of influence of the Korean military can never be underestimated in figuring out what has happened so far and what will happen in terms of national development of Korea.

Many scholars have done research on the relationship between the military and national development. Much has been argued for the positive as well as negative roles of the military in developing countries. Korea is no exception in this sense. Historically speaking, civilian orientation of Korean cultural tradition and traditional Korea's *Confucian* culture were overwhelmingly dominant until 1961. Only infrequently throughout Korean history had the armed forces played a major role, although there were wars and revolutions led by men in uniform. Korean Confucian societal hierarchy prohibited the armed forces from playing a truly dominant role. This was true at least until 1961 when the Military Revolution took place. The remainder of this chapter will review the Korean military tradition.

##### A. THE KOREAN MILITARY TRADITION BEFORE LIBERATION (1945)

Even though there were several military heroes who were successful in founding dynasties after the *Unified Silla* in 676 A.D., the tradition of complete civilian supremacy would never allow military interventions. Throughout most of Korean

history the military branch of the national bureaucracy was effectively degraded to an inferior status. For example, every possible means were used to deter the emergence of military heroes. It is well known that the military officers of the central government in Koryo dynasty (918-1392), having been subjected to extremely harsh and humiliating arrogance upon them by the civilian officials, finally staged a bloody coup d'état in 1170 A.D. [Ref. 4:p. 1].

During the *Choson dynasty (1392-1910)* founded by Yi, Song-Gye, the civilian elite seemed to have worried about possible military involvement. The fear of potential threat to the civilian supremacy was so great throughout the five centuries of the Choson dynasty that the military officers failed to compel the ruling elite to strengthen the military power necessary to defend the nation from the impending menace of military aggression by the Hideyoshi Japan [Ref. 4:p. 2].

It is also well-known that one of Korea's few pre-eminent heroes, Admiral Yi, Sun-Sin, who saved the country from the Japanese invasion in the fifteenth century, was indicted on the charge of high treason even during the time of war. These kinds of incidents happened frequently due to the ideology of civil-supremacy and to the worst form of the factionalism among the elite.

The anti-militaristic tradition prevailed even after the bitter experience that military weakness resulted only in dehumanization and destruction of basic human rights. This was caused by the cruel foreign invaders such as the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, the Japanese invasion of the fifteenth century, and continued when Yi dynasty was annexed by Japan in 1910. However, the civil-supremacist rulers could still argue against the necessity of maintaining a sizable



standing army so long as the political survival of the nation itself was not in jeopardy.

During the last Korean dynasty of *Yi*, the anti-military tradition seemed to have been based on the ruling elite's fear of any other sources of power rather than on the kind of political order the ruling elite preferred under the official Confucian ideology which favored the civil-supremacy. Furthermore, Korea's Confucian societal hierarchy prohibited armed forces from playing a truly dominant role and the military had no choice but to obey civilian leadership. In this context, it seems to have been very difficult for a military tradition to take shape.

After the *Yi* dynasty ended, Korea was colonized by Japan. During the Japanese domination (1910-1945), the colonial rule exacerbated the feeling of anti-militarism due to the atrocities of Japanese military. This experience made worse the anti-military tradition of *Chosun* dynasty.

Ironically, the Japanese were instrumental in founding the current Korean military. After the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese began to train a limited number of Koreans to serve as officers in the Japanese armed forces. In 1933, the Chinese Nationalist Government trained hundreds of Koreans in its military schools under an agreement between the Provisional Government leader Kim Ku and Chiang Kai-Shek. Many of these Korean officers, mostly the Japanese-trained, played a major role in founding the Korean armed forces after the liberation from Japan.

## B. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE KOREAN MILITARY

Japan's surrender was unexpected, and, consequently, liberation was followed by much confusion. Adding to the confusion, Korea was divided both physically and emotionally. The country was divided by the 38th parallel with the northern half occupied by the Soviet Union and the southern half by the United States. The Korean nation was not consulted at all in this decision. It was only the military expedience of the occupying powers that imposed the tragic decision on Korea.

The American occupation forces took part in maintaining law and order after receiving the Japanese surrender, and later of organizing the forthcoming Korean armed forces. Right after the arrival of these forces, the *Korean Constabulary* was activated with the assistance of American Military Government in Korea. It was those Koreans who had served in the Japanese armed forces that formed the nucleus of the Constabulary. Diverse backgrounds were the characteristic of the Constabulary from the start.

The initial corps of Constabulary officers consisted of five different groups of Japanese trained officers. Twenty graduates of the Imperial Defense College in Tokyo who had served their World War II service as officers in the Japanese Army were the elite among them. The forty-plus former Japanese Army officers trained in the Manchurian Academy was the second best trained group. A third group was the student officers, and a fourth group was composed of men who had volunteered for Japanese service in 1938 without particular prior educational experience. The fifth and the least prestigious group of Japanese Army veterans had served as conscripts. [Ref. 5:pp. 336-337]

In 1946, the Seoul English Language School, which had previously been established for breaking down the language barrier between the U.S. advisors and Koreans, became the Korean Constabulary Training Center for Constabulary officers. On June 15, 1946, the Department of National Defense became the Department of Internal Security. The Department contained the bureaus of Police and Armed Forces. The Bureau of Armed Forces contained the bureaus of Constabulary and the Coast Guard. The Korean Coast Guard was established on June 15, 1946. On September 11, 1946, the Koreans became responsible for the administration of the department with the American personnel assuming advisory status.

The United States Military Government in Korea ended when the Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948. With the appearance of the new Republic, the importance of a defense force increased. The Korean government formed a Ministry of National Defense, while the Korean Constabulary was reorganized as the Republic of Korea Army on September 5, 1948. On May 5, 1948, a small aviation unit was formed within the Korean Constabulary. This unit was the nucleus of Korea's modern Air Force. Along with the two service branches, the Marine Corps was established within the Navy. There were 94,974 men in the Army at the time of the outbreak of the *Korean War*, compared with 6,956 in the Navy, 1,697 in the Air Force, and 1,166 in the Marine Corps [Ref. 6:pp. 32-33].

The new Republic of Korea possessed no organizations, resources, or technology upon which to build such a large and powerful military. Consequently, the Korean armed forces at this moment was in an infant stage, and naturally, the United States

armed forces at this moment was in an infant stage, and naturally, the United States played a great role in helping the rapid growth of the Korean military.

Korea, though, would have taken far more time to build such a large Armed Forces if not for the Korean War. Hahm argues that the Korean Armed Forces would have remained small and weak because of the lingering anti-military bias still deeply rooted in the Korean psyche. He also claims that given the uncertain future prospect for the new Republic in the context of the overwhelming national desire for reunification, little need was perceived to devote scarce economic and human resources to a military build-up. Economic poverty was severe, so was the shortage of trained personnel. Having a powerful military was not a high priority for the newly emerging country. [Ref. 4:p. 12]

During three years of war, with the assistance from the United States, the Republic of Korea armed forces were expanded and improved in both quantity and quality. By the middle of 1954, the Korean Armed Forces had grown to twenty active Army divisions and ten reserve divisions, with a strengthened Navy, and an Air Force equipped with jet planes.

### C. GROWTH OF MILITARY POWER

As already indicated the Republic of Korea suffered the traumas of an infant republic when it was founded on August 1948. A new government was established for 20 million people with little resources at its disposal. Also, the limited number of developmental resources left behind by Japan were destroyed during the Korean War. Independence was, however, welcome and euphoria was generated for a promising future.



The government of the First Republic was, however, overthrown by a massive student uprising in April, 1960. The immediate cause of the uprising was a rigged election in March of that year with President Rhee of the First Republic and his *Liberal Party* attempting to stay in power. The student uprisings were spontaneous at the outset, but the public soon joined them. The Rhee regime had been suffering from much negative criticism from the citizens. The general public believed that President Rhee was too old and had been in power too long, that there were too much corruption in government, that the economy had been suffering from stagnation and depression, and that there were too many profiteers in and out of government [Ref. 7:pp. 83-92].

In July, 1960, two months after the downfall of the Rhee regime caused by the student demonstration, a free election took place and the *Democratic Party* won an overwhelming majority. However, even after the election, political instability continued. The Second Republic of the Democratic Party was not strong enough to carry out the democratic process. It also lacked political leadership. On May 16, 1961, a small group of Korea's powerful Armed Forces seized power in an almost bloodless revolution, uprooting the uncertain democratic experiment of the Second Republic.

The revolution took place on the 16th of May, and the next day, the military of 30 men, comprised primarily of generals and colonels headed by General Park Chung Hee, took charge of national affairs. The same day this *Revolutionary Committee* announced their public pledges for revolution. The Committee's plan emphasized a stronger anti-communist stand and contained a strong pledge to



eradicate all corruption and social evils. Furthermore, the Committee promised to rejuvenate the demoralized national spirit and to concentrate their efforts to establish a self-supporting economy.

There are a number of scholars who agree that the military revolution was welcomed by the majority of Koreans even though there is not much empirical data available to support that statement. For example, Chai described a great sense of relief among the people when the military took over the corrupt and inefficient government [Ref. 6:p. 36]. Kim said that the military assumption of power in 1961 was welcomed by the people at the outset as a surgical device to remedy the ills of the country [Ref. 7:pp. 83-92].

When the military succeeded in the revolution and assumed power, the military pledged their revolutionary mission of political change, economic growth, and social reform. General Park, as the leader of the *Junta*, became the standard bearer of the junta-created *Democratic Republican Party* and ran successfully for president of the Third Republic. Many in the junta and other military personnel took off their uniforms and ran for the national assembly or served in the Government. The 1961 revolution brought the military into the main stream of Korean politics and national development.

## V. SOCIETAL ROLE OF THE KOREAN MILITARY

### A. THE MILITARY AS A MODERN INSTITUTION

At the outbreak of the *Korean War*, the size of the Korean military was about 100,000 men. However, the ROK Army was deficient of necessary weapons to stop the North Korean attack. It lacked both an armored tank force and any significant anti-tank weaponry. Its Navy and Air Force were practically non-existent. The Korean War, however, transformed the American perception of security in East Asia. Korea was then included within the defense perimeter of the United States, and Washington started investing in Korean defense. During the war, and soon thereafter, the size of the Korean military was increased several fold to some 600,000 men.

As a part of its war effort, the United States allocated vast resources to the training and education of the Korean military, especially its officer corps. During the war itself, the fighting capabilities of the Korean military had to be improved and modern techniques of planning and management had to be learned. In the period following the *armistice*, a large number of Korean officers were sent to the United States to receive training and acquire managerial and administrative skills. In terms of sheer magnitude of money, manhours, and intellectual investment, the military share of education and training received from America far outweighed those received by the civilian sector of the nation. The transfer of technology, weapons, logistic support, and financial aid for the development of a strong Korean military immediately followed. Thus, the Korean military became the most modernized

segment of the nation. As Lucian Pye, among others, has maintained, the military in the context of third world development is the most modern and easily created organization [Ref. 3:p. 105].

In the context of development, the Korean military stood as the most modern institution. Its enormous size in Korea, dictated by cold war considerations and maintained by American aid, has made it the most powerful and best organized group within Korean society. Through its conscription and recruitment practices, it is in contact with the people at the grass roots level. Men from every village are drafted into the military service, then discharged back into the society at the rate of 200,000 per year. During their stay in the military, men learn to handle and operate modern equipment, to drive vehicles, and to relate in new ways to new forms of organization. Furthermore, they come into contact with urban life. They also become geographically mobile.

During this period, the Korean military has not only strengthened its military power for national security but enhanced its role in modernizing Korean society in such a manner that the military contributes personnel, equipment, oil, rice, cement, tents, wood and bus services in the areas of construction, education, agriculture, health and social welfare.

## **B. THE MILITARY AS A NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION**

Among other contributions, more apparent and conventional in nature, made by the military to Korea's nation-building is the function of military as a school for young people.

By bringing young men from every section of the country into an organized group, the military conscription has rendered a valuable service for national integration. Sectionalism, dating all the way back to the *Three Kingdoms* period prior to the unification by Silla (676 A.D), has bedeviled the nation throughout its history. This sectionalism would certainly have been far more destructive had it not been tempered by the experience of young recruits sharing the nationally organized disciplined life together with those who came from various parts of the country. In this sense, the military was truly a national body, representing the entire nation. [Ref. 4:p. 12]

The Korean military has effectively performed its educational function. Travel, made possible by the military service, has itself been a best form of living education. It enabled the youths to see various parts of the country which most of them would not have had the opportunity of seeing on their own. Their travel experience, thus gained during their military service, immeasurably enhanced their mobility in their subsequent civilian life. In the early days of the Republic, even literacy was one of the major benefits of military service. Later on, vocational training has become much more important. Everyone was required to master at least one skill during his service. The rapid development of Korean economy would not have been feasible without the technical training provided by the military.

A farm boy from a remote corner of the country not only learned to drive a motor vehicle, maintain a machine, repair an engine, operate a radio, but also became conscious of his ability to shape and condition his productive environment. A man-made horticultural environment, for example, could be created by using



inexpensive transparent vinyl sheets. By maintaining certain level of temperature, moisture, light and soil fertility, such vegetables and berries as previously could only be enjoyed in summer could be produced in bitterly cold winter. A man who had before submitted himself helplessly to the whims of nature now begins to make his own climate to suit his own production schedule. Thermometer, soil analysis kit, humidifier, drier, sensitive and accurate scale, and timing devices, in short, the instruments of science, now become indispensable implements of farming just as hoes, sickles and ploughs have been traditionally. [Ref. 4:p. 13]

Experience of travel by motor vehicles enables a young farmer to be conscious of distance to the market for his produce. Distance is increasingly measured by time it takes to reach a destination by various modern means of transportation rather than in terms of kilometers, because the freshness of his delicate out-of season produce is a critical factor in obtaining a highest possible price for it. [Ref. 4:p. 14]

A significant portion of these farm youths has decided to settle in the cities, using their newly acquired skills to earn a living. This phenomenon has clearly aggravated the problem of overcrowding in the cities. Although the inability of city governments to provide minimally adequate services to the accelerating influx of new inhabitants has appeared to worsen as time passed, the possession of industrially useful skills by the ex-servicemen has greatly mitigated the sort of social and political difficulty caused in other Third World countries by the migration of the dispossessed rural poor to the urban centers.

In the Korean context, it has been the *pull* exerted by the rapidly growing industrial sector which has attracted those youths who possessed necessary skills

rather than the rural area expelling the unemployable surplus labor without industrially usable skills. [Ref. 4:p. 15]

The *Saemaul Movement* (Korea's rural development plan) would have been just another example of many failures experienced by developing countries but for the new leadership provided by those young farmers whose exposure to the military life gave them a new perspective on farm life. They were not only technologically innovative, but commercially oriented also. Their farming activities were dictated by the vicissitude of urban markets rather than by the force of tradition or age-old habit. As the government's programs of rural electrification and road construction coincided with the *agrarian cultural revolution* led by the young leadership, Korea's economic development could gain a sustained momentum [Ref. 4:p. 17].

The educational impact of the military is especially noteworthy. Particularly in the early years of the Republic, the military served as the largest primary educational institution for those young recruits without any formal schooling. Because of its size, particularly in the case of Korea, the military also constitutes a state within the state in its administrative structures. Men are trained to fill the various administrative and managerial posts with the military institutions. The military also maintains a variety of training institutes, training officers and enlisted men through various courses. According to one account, there were at one time 110 and 227 different courses dealing with various fields of knowledge and skills respectively for officers and enlisted men [Ref. 4:p. 19]. The military training has provided both a pool of trained people whose talents are available for public and private organizations.



### C. MILITARY ELITE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Since the 1961 military revolution, the country has indeed made remarkable strides in modern development, more impressive than most other newly-emerging nations.

The tables in the Appendix show that Korea has achieved an impressive record of development and has improved the standard of living of the average citizen much more quickly than most other third world countries. Korea's average annual growth rate of GNP per capita in 1960-1978 was 6.9 percent, a remarkable record of growth. In the process, Korea has been able to transform itself from an underdeveloped agrarian society to a rapidly industrializing country [Ref. 8:p. 266].

The overall rise in the standard of living of the people is also shown by the quality of life indicators. The life expectancy at birth has considerably increased, from 54 in 1978 to 63 in 1960, and the child death rate for the age group of one to four years declined considerably from 13 percent to 5 percent in the same period. The population per physician indicators also show that the situation in 1977 (1960 persons per physician) was better than in 1960 (3000 per physician) [Ref. 8:p. 267].

How did the Korean military elite manage to put the Korean economy on the track to the great success it has achieved in the intervening years? There are a variety of documents that describe the negative side of a military's ability to stimulate economic development. Janowitz believes that militaries do not have appropriate skills and training, nor adequate goals to carry out economic development [Ref. 9:p. 129]. On the contrary, the Korean military regime has shown considerable political skill and a remarkable ability for solving challenging

economic problems. They did it by being pragmatic and using the best available resources to them. The military-backed elite under President Park, having recognized the shortcoming that they did not have adequate economic skills for the huge task at hand, became active partners with economic experts who would resolve economic problems, and assigned themselves tasks they could manage [Ref. 10:p. 97].

There were three essential tasks assumed by the elite: rebuilding a national commitment to succeed, helping to create the societal and material infrastructure so necessary to economic success, and maintaining the security necessary to enable everything else to proceed in safety. [Ref. 10:pp. 95-98]

The military-backed elite worked strenuously with civilian society toward creating the national esprit needed to rebuild the values of Korea's past. From the mid-1960s the elite stressed a variation of Korea's traditional Confucian virtues: diligence, frugality, and group identity. The military-backed elite succeeded in rebuilding Korea's ethic to succeed. An esprit, a drive, was infused in Korean society that was not evident before President Park initiated his campaign combining moral rearmament with ethnic pride. The military also played an important role in bolstering the material infrastructure of the state. Armed forces generally are seen as a drag on the economy of the state that sustains them, which in a certain sense is true. However, there is another side to that story. Armed forces can play a positive economic role, especially in developing countries [Ref. 10:pp. 95-98]. In the case of Korea, the armed forces initially played an important economic role by helping to construct facilities such as railroads, roads and bridges, etc., which

contributed to the economic well-being of the country. Perhaps even more important than the concrete artifacts they produced were the training and confidence the Korean armed forces gained from completing these project.

Given the large numbers who have passed through the Korean armed forces, many relatively skilled civilian workers have emerged from the uniformed ranks to help the Korean economy grow and prosper. Still more important are the number of retired high-ranking officers who have become economic entrepreneurs. They adapted the technical and administrative skills they learned in uniform to the private sector. These contributions of the military and the ex-military to Korea's material infrastructure are quite important to Korea's economic well-being.

Finally, there can be no doubt that all the Korean armed forces have done their duties well in protecting Korea from the dangers of a second North Korean attack. Despite North Korea's proximity and warlike spirit, the Korean armed forces have provided an atmosphere of stability sufficient to warrant solid foreign business confidence in the security of their trade and investments. That is a very significant achievement, one to which the healthy Korean economy owes a great debt.

## VI. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CIVILIAN AREA

The Korean military has also had a significant impact on the civilian sector. The military has been involved in activities such as agriculture, construction, public education, public health, and the like which fall outside the primary mission of the armed forces. Korean military men have assisted farmers in rice planting and harvesting; they have built dams, roads, and schools; they have distributed food, medical supplies, machines and equipment to needy civilians; and they have entertained and educated villagers and provided them with medical treatment. Military units at times have also established fraternal relationships with civilian communities and schools and have organized civilian youth groups.

### A. CIVIC SUPPORT

The civic support of the Army engineer corps centers around road construction, building, and restoration work. Its superior capability and confidence in these areas were fully demonstrated by the results of *Road Development Project*. Up until 1967 it has completed 625.0 Km of road pavement, 356.0 Km of road expansion, and ten bridge construction projects, providing 1,700,894 men and 343,184 pieces of equipments per year. It also has completed construction on the most dangerous and difficult parts of the 31.1 km highway between Seoul and Busan, which was almost given up by the civilian company [Ref. 11:p. 73].

Back in 1959, with the support of the United States Operating Mission (USCOM), Korean and U.S. Armed Forces jointly were involved in *ROK & US*



*Joint Highway Project.* This project linked strategically critical points and contributed to the economic and industrial development of the government. Until 1970, a total of 693.3 Km of road construction was successfully completed [Ref. 11:p. 79].

Activities were not limited to Korean highway projects. Between November 1965 and December 1967, the engineer corps was actively involved in civic support action in Vietnam. In this period, 1,110 Km of road and 719 bridges were constructed or repaired using 189,865 military personnel and 29,063 pieces of equipment [Ref. 11:p. 90].

The Air Force and the Army Aviation have also been active in civic support, making significant contribution to life saving operations in times of flood, fire, traffic accidents, and mine accidents. Between 1958 and 1981, Air Force and Army Aviation completed 305 search and rescue missions, rescuing 3,691 people due to various disasters. During this period they also have provided transportation over 8,000 times for VIP transport and 1,380 times for remote place transport [Ref. 11:p. 91].

The Navy also has played an active part in saving victims of sea disasters along Korean coasts and has been active in the marine resource excavation program which requires highly advanced and technical military assistance. In the sea disaster rescue operations, the Navy has saved 658 ships and 4,769 people as of 1980. In the excavation operations of relics in the seabed, the Navy has picked up over 14,000 pieces of precious national treasures from the sea [Ref. 11:p. 91]. On the sea transportation side, the navy is also quite active in transportation of resources and

manpower to various location. In 1969, the Navy implemented the *Remote Island public Relation Program*. Under this program, benefits and services such as medical treatments, movies, photograph shows, and invitations of remote island children to Seoul were provided to local residents.

## **B. TECHNICAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AREA**

Korean armies are equipped with new weapons and machineries. Consequently, their enlisted men and officers have to acquire the new skills of machine operation and advanced techniques in maintenance. These skills and techniques generally do not exist in civilian communities.

The Korean military is equipped with modern and advanced weapons and allocates vast resources to training, education, and technological development. Such functions are normally performed by the military technology institutions. Korean military technology institutions, patterned after those of their American counterparts, were founded immediately after establishment of the Korean Armed Forces. In this early period schools with various specialties and technologies such as combat intelligence and communications were organized. The military special and technical schools established by June 1949 were the Combat Intelligence School, Signal School, Engineer School, Artillery School, Ordinance School, Military Police School, and Band School. Later, the Quartermaster School, Medical School, Finance School, Infantry School and Command and General Staff College were added. During 1951 and 1952, the Adjutant General School and Armor School were established. By 1962, new schools such as the Women's Army Corps School,



Army Nurses School, Chemical School, Army Aviation School and Logistics School were established.

The more industrialized Korean society becomes, the more trained personnel it needs. Moreover, most of the MOS's (Military Occupational Specialties) in the Navy and Air Force such as aviation, meteorology, navigation, and electronic equipment maintenance can directly be transferred into society which lacks the schools and institutions to teach these specialized skills.

The Korean army, which obtains necessary training and education through systematic 221 MOS in 16 schools as of 1981, maintains close relationships with the civic sector and plays an important role in industrialization. Each school has trained young men in various technical areas. Everyone was required to master at least one skill during his service. Technological training provided by the military technology institutions is quite impressive. Between 1961 and 1975, over one million young people were trained while they were in the military in the highly specialized areas of machinery, construction, communication, electricity, electronics, physics, chemistry, transportation, navigation, aviation and meteorology. Efforts to develop further specialized technicians were made in vehicle maintenance, ordinance maintenance, compressor machine, mechanical machine, airplane maintenance, and special weapon repairs.

From 1975 to 1980, some 512,260 military personnel were successful candidates of the *National Technical Qualification Examination*. During the same period, the portion of licensed technicians who acquired qualification during military service reached 18% of total licensed technicians in automobile repairs and maintenance

field, 25% in hazardous material handling, and 14% of electricity technicians [Ref. 11:p. 125].

To aid former soldiers in using their newly obtained skills in the civilian job market, the military has conducted the *Vocational Guiding Education Program*. This program was designed to provide necessary manpower required for the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan which had been promoted on a national scale since July 1967. Between 1969 and 1980, over 8,000 retiring soldiers benefited from this program [Ref. 11:p. 131]. These retired soldiers learned various kinds of skills and techniques such as heavy machine operation and maintenance, pipe laying, welding, vehicle maintenance, accounting and bookkeeping.

As described so far, it is clear that in Korean society the military is an important instrument for youth socialization and a significant agency for future technical manpower. It is true that, according to Mr. Kwon Doo-Young, the military has a great advantage in teaching skills and techniques for the following reasons.

First, most of the enlisted men are the right age for vocational training. Secondly, it is relatively easy to teach them to use modern equipment because they must soon use these equipments as part of their jobs. Finally, this training can be done with comparatively small expense using the existing organizational structure and equipment. [Ref. 12:p. 252]

As both the military and society move toward modernization, it is possible that the skills required by the military will overlap with those needed in the technological society more than ever.

### C. MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA

Numerous medical officers and nurses were trained during the Korean War. Since 1952, the military also has aggressively promoted both domestic and foreign education in order to develop medical specialists capable of performing in such medical areas as military surgery, dentistry, nursing and medical administration. It is no doubt that returning to the civic sector after conscription, these trained professionals have been utilized to satisfy manpower demands in the civic sector.

One of the military's biggest contributions in the medical science area includes progressive research and development activities and the accumulation of medical skills. Neuro-Surgery in Korea was in a rudimentary stage, but it began rapidly to develop when the First Neuro-Surgery Team was founded in March, 1952. Afterwards the Third Army General Hospital was designated as Neuro-Surgical Treatment Center and began to conduct specialized treatment. Many medical officers were trained in the United States and O.J.T. for the treatment of Neuro-Surgical patients.

The *E.H.F.(Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever)*, a disease generated first in Korea during the Korean War, appeared in the field army area and spread into the whole country in the 1970s. To cope with the disease, the military established and operated the First E.H.F. Research Institute and Treatment Center. This center with the cooperation of the college hospital made significant progress in the study of E.H.F. [Ref. 11:p.140].

The ocean and Underwater Medical Research Center was founded to solve the medical problems related to diving and to study the prevention of diving accidents.

It is a unique facility dedicated to the study of ocean and underwater medicine in Korea.

The Aeromedical Research Center, established in 1952, is the only institute to conduct a study on aeromedical science and aero-staffs' health treatment. The center has published a scholarly journal *Aeromedical Science* from 1952 and has published over 500 articles. For study and training, it has many training devices such as a *lower pressure chamber*, and a *human centrifuge* which are the only ones in Korea. The center conducts physical tests and health examinations for all civilian pilots and crewmen. [Ref. 11:p. 140] For the first time in Korea, Armed Forces Nursing Academy conducted aerospace and diving nursing education. The military also established the Medical Equipment Corps which is a unique training institute in Korea, and also the military is the first institution in Korea to produce artificial limbs and eyes.

As described so far, it is clear that the Korean Military has made significant contributions to the development of medical science and medical capabilities in connection with the civilian sector.

#### **D. GENERAL MANPOWER PRODUCTION AREA**

As of 1981, the Korean military has produced so far a huge labor force totalling 3,942,013 veterans, including 425 generals, 803 full colonels and 180,911 skilled air personnel and 316,029 naval personnel [Ref. 11:p. 154]. During the 1960s and 1970s, Korea has made enormous efforts to bolster its economic development through its four *Five-Year Economic Development Plans* which require both skilled and manual workers who are available from the ranks of retired veterans.



The military forces have also provided educational service to civilians including public officers, police, national defense members, military instructors, and general college students. In return selected military officers were sent to civilian universities to gain knowledge about social sciences and natural sciences to enhance overall quality of the officers corps. The scope of education of the armed forces was not limited at home. Numerous officers went abroad to study advanced management technique and various technical subjects.

The armed forces have been effective in the field of enhancement of language skills and development of administrative and management capabilities. Language skills in English, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Thai, German, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese have been actively cultivated for the purpose of translation and interpretation. Benefit of language education offered in the military have also been extended to the civilian sector where specialized knowledge in language is demanded. The number of interpreters in active service increased dramatically after the establishment of the *ROK-US Combined Forces Command* and the initiation of ROK-US combined military exercises.

To develop administrative manpower training in general administration, personnel administration, manpower management, officers attended training programs in Korea and abroad. Curricula in accounting, management, leadership, and planning were also offered to generate skilled personnel among the ranks. Frequent foreign inspections and foreign official trips were executed to enhance and widen officers' knowledge and experience. These elaborate efforts exerted to develop high-quality manpower can be seen in the occupational distribution of retired high ranking

officers. Taking the leading part in each area, they are spread throughout government institutions, public enterprises, educational areas, and other important fields.



## VII. CONCLUSION

During the last thirty years, Korean society has experienced a significant increase in the role, influence, responsibility, and expertise of the military. The role and contribution of the military has been extensive for the nation-building of the newly independent country, the maintenance of national security, economic and social development, and the cultivation of nationalism and national spirit. Clearly the Korean military services have contributed immeasurably to the modernization and development of the nation.

The Korean military managed to put the Korean economy on track by being pragmatic and confident and by working hard. The military elite worked strenuously toward creating the national esprit and rebuilding the values of Korea's past. And they were successful. The military also played an important role by producing for the private sector skilled and experienced former military personnel.

The Korean military has also been effective in performing its educational function. By bringing young men from every section of the country into an organized group, military conscription has rendered a valuable service for national integration. It also played a significant role in maintaining the country's conservative political wing and acting as an ideological stabilizer.

Furthermore, the Korean military has conducted various types of technological and medical research, compensating for the lack of and weakness in comparable civilian research institutions. Other areas of service provided by the military include the direct aid to the civilian community through construction projects and disaster

relief operations. The military as a modern organization and modernizing agent has been successful in contributing to strengthening essential administrative functions and raising standards in public administration.

While the military contributed to the civilian sector providing both a trained labor force and administrative technology, it has also established *reserve forces* with over a million veterans whose main strategic function is to mobilize forces for active combat against infiltrating North Korean guerrillas. The greatest contribution, however, has been that which is a common mission to all military services throughout the world: national security. There can be no doubt that all the Korean Armed Forces have done their duty to successfully protect Korea from the danger of war. The military has provided an atmosphere of stability and a military shield behind which the sound and healthy economy is possible.

The Korean military has grown in its own organizational strength by a complex mixture of social practice, norms, and interactions. It is natural that the military's future strength depends on its own combat capability and also on associated civilian support and understanding and communication.

Even though the military is composed of all strata of society and contains the same ideology and values as the civilian population, there still exists a communication and understanding gap between the military and civilian population. Civilians think the military is too conservative, rigid and authoritative. They also have tendency to think that the military is not keeping up with changes in the times. On the other hand, the military thinks that civilians do not fully understand the current situation of national security and that they misunderstand the roles of the

Korean military. This gap is not, however, the result of disapproval of each other or an attitude of indifference, but rather it is the result of differing interests pursuing the same national goal: peace, freedom, and prosperity.

In order to decrease this gap and enhance mutual understanding, the military must take an active effort to improve public relations by increasing civilian awareness of what the military does in Korea and explaining how it supports civilian population activities. These efforts can be accomplished through effective use of mass media campaign which would provide the public with more knowledge of what the military does. The military also must be active in providing the public with more opportunities to see and understand the military, such as encouraging close relations with the civilian sector through the establishment of sisterhood relationships with civilian sectors, opening the military bases and activities within bases to the public to reduce barriers between the two groups. Furthermore, getting more involved in social activities such as sports, cultural festivals, and academic fields would also be a good way for the military to enhance the mutual understanding.

In Korea, the military and the society share common goals and aspirations. In this context, we must stress greater professionalism by the military, thus raising the general level of its capability while also striving to foster better communication with the civilian sector. By doing so, the military will be able to be a more professional and capable institution armed with greater responsibility and maturity.

The future contribution of the military to Korea's national development will greatly depend upon its ability to recognize the limitation of every profession,

especially its own, and to secure cooperation with specialists and experts in other fields to take fullest advantage of their divergent experience and wisdom for the purpose of accelerating the development of this country.

## APPENDIX A

### IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE MILITARY TAKEOVER

Problem Area	Image of the Past (Under Civilian Rule)	Image of the Future (To Be Developed by Military Rule)
National Security	Nation Weakened against external threat through factional strife, and inadequate leadership; susceptible to Communism.	Nation strong before its enemies.
Economy	Subsistence economy, heavily dependent upon the U.S., oriented to lavish consumption items.	Self-sufficient economy providing for the welfare of all, attained through planning, emphasis on primary industry, expanded base of trade.
Social Values and Ideals	Continued prevalence of decadent Confucian ideas and customs. Rampant hedonism and corruption, even among the young.	Prevalence of modern ideas; achievement-oriented society. Cultivation of a new morality, based upon austerity. Rejuvenation of the ideals of the young.
Social and Political Structure	Factions, parties, and cliques feuding with one another and pursuing their own self-interest under the guise of democracy.	National solidarity; "Administrative Democracy."
Govern-mental Leadership	Those in power committed to self-aggrandisement, profiteering at the expense of the people. Rulers incapable as well as irresponsible.	Those in power committed selflessly building the nation and promoting the welfare of the people. Rulers wise and efficient.



# APPENDIX B

## QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

### I. LIFE AND EDUCATION INDICATORS

Description		Year	Korea	Thailand	Indonesia
Quality of Life	Life Expectance at Birth(Years)	1960	54	51	41
		1978	63	61	47
	Child Death Rate (Aged 1-4)	1960	13	15	31
		1978	5	6	20
	Population Per Physician	1960	3,000	7,800	41,000
		1977	1,960	8,170	14,580
	% Population with Access to Safe Water	1975	62	22	12
Education	Number Enrolled in Primary School as % of Age Group	1960	94	83	71
		1977	111	83	81
	Number Enrolled in Secondary School as % of Age Group	1960	27	13	6
		1977	88	27	21
	Number Enrolled in Higher Education as % of Population (Aged 20-24)	1960	5	2	1
		1976	11	5	2
	Adult Literacy Rate (in Percentage)	1960	71	68	39
		1975	93	84	62

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1980

## II. URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Description		Year	Korea	Thailand	Indonesia
Urbanization	Urban Population as % of total	1960	28	13	15
		1980	55	14	20
	Average Annual Growth Rate of Urban Population (in Percentage)	60-70	6.2	3.7	3.8
		70-80	4.8	3.5	3.6
	% Urban Population in Cities of over 500,000 persons	1960	61	65	34
		1980	77	68	49
Industrialization	% Disbribution of GDP in Agriculture	1960	40	40	54
		1978	24	27	31
	% Disbribution of GDP in Industry	1960	19	19	14
		1978	36	27	33
	% Distribution of GDP in Service	1960	41	41	32
		1978	40	46	36
	Value Added in Manufacturing (Millions of 1970 US\$)	1970	1,431	1,048	854
		1976	3,934	2,101	1,671
	Energy Consumption per Capita (in Kilograms of Coal Equivalent)	1960	258	64	129
		1978	1,359	327	278

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981

# APPENDIX C

## THE ADVANCEMENT OF MILITARY ELITES

### I. HIGH GOVERNMENT POSTS (1948-1975)

Period Post	Pre-Military (1948.8-1961.5)		Military Rule (1961.5-1963.12)		Post-Military (1963.12-1975.8)	
	Total	Mil(%)	Total	Mil(%)	Total	Mil(%)
Premier	7	1(14.3)	3	2(66.7)	4	2(50.0)
Cabinet Minister	152	11(7.2)	49	27(55.1)	120	42(35.0)
Provincial Governor	110	-	17	11(64.7)	56	18(32.1)
House Speaker	39	-	-	-	18	6(33.3)

Source: Data collected by C.I. Eugene Kim and John P. Lovell, Government Elites of the Republic of Korea, 1948-1979

### II. EMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED GENERALS (As of 1976)

Position	Number
National Assembly, member	36
Government Post, non-diplomatic, high rank	53
Diplomatic post	17
Public Enterprise, manager or staff member	76
Private Enterprise, manager or staff member	169
Civic Organization Foundation president or staff member	58
Self Employed	33
Others	45
Foreign Resident	17
Unemployed, unknown	128
Total	632

Source: ROK Veterans Association, compiled.

APPENDIX D  
CIVIC ACTION AREA

I. CIVIC SUPPORT ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES (DURING 1966)

A. Mobilized Military Personnel and Equipment

FLD	Description Unit SVC	Mobilized Military Personnel	Military Army Equipment Used																						
			Trk 2 1/2		Trk 3/4	Trk Dump	Bul- dozer	Crane	Grader	Compressor	Roller	Bus	Naval Vess.	Other											
			EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA										
Total	Total	1,585,020	11,462	106	24,578	10,980	365	299	2,230	86	189	931	8,136												
	Army	1,563,252	10,858	14	24,412	10,533	323	289	2,029	8	-	-	7,628												
	Navy	9,811	407	66	1	15	-	10	-	-	147	931	223												
	AF	7,301	99	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	-	172												
	MC	4,656	98	-	165	432	42	-	201	78	-	-	115												
Construction	Sub-T	387,939	1,759	22	18,628	7,032	318	210	1,834	18	2	-	6,358												
	Army	387,424	1,715	-	18,628	6,956	310	210	1,714	8	-	-	6,342												
	Navy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-												
	AF	149	44	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	16												
	MC	366	-	-	-	76	8	-	120	10	-	-	-												
Education	Sub-T	10,176	303	-	356	409	-	10	5	-	17	37	87												
	Army	4,482	234	-	350	396	-	10	5	-	-	-	72												
	Navy	1,742	67	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	15												
	AF	630	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	37	-												
	MC	322	2	-	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-											

Description Unit SVC	Mobilized Military Personnel	Military Army Equipment Used															
		Trk 2 1/2	Trk 3/4	Trk Dump	Bul- dozer	Crane	Gra- der	Comp- ressor	Roll- er	Bus	Naval Vess.	Other					
		EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA			
FLD	PER																
Agriculture	Sub-T	1,115,611	59	5,386	3,350	17	79	311	34	20	878	1,135					
	Army	1,103,434	-	5,244	3,087	13	79	310	-	-	-	943					
	Navy	3,337	59	1	-	-	-	-	-	6	878	192					
	AF	6,236	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-					
	MC	2,604	-	141	263	4	-	21	34	-	-	-					
Health & Social	Sub-T	61,765	21	19	5	-	-	-	-	8	15	92					
	Army	60,458	14	17	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	75					
	Navy	1,104	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	16					
	AF	199	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	1					
	MC	4	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
Social Welfare	Sub-T	9,529	4	189	184	30	-	60	34	142	1	406					
	Army	4,454	-	173	89	-	-	-	-	-	-	196					
	Navy	3,628	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	141	1	-					
	AF	87	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	155					
	MC	1,360	17	16	91	30	-	60	34	-	-	115					

Source : Civil AFF, DIV, MND



B. Military Materials and Commodities Supported for Civic Actions

Description Unit SVC FLD	Gas		Diesel Oil		Fuel Oil		Cem.		Grease		TNT		Wood		Medicine		Money		Other	
	G/L		G/L		G/L		Bag		G/L		LB		m <sup>3</sup>		\$		\$		EA	
Total	258,678		1,027,251		6,563	711		11,736		4,000		13,346		20,399		128,887		488		
Army	256,920		1,002,480		-	-		11,736		-		-		-		-		61		
Navy	1,294		4,306		5,291	109		-		4,000		4,006		20,399		128,887		29		
AF	342		933		-	-		-		-		-		-		-		19		
MC	122		19,532		1,272	652		-		-		9,340		-		-		379		
Sub-T	252,818		993,146		-	-		11,736		-		-		-		-		61		
Army	252,506		991,978		-	-		11,736		-		-		-		-		61		
Navy	-		-		-	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		
AF	195		248		-	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		
MC	117		920		-	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		
Construction																				
Sub-T	752		5,154		544	652		-		-		9,340		-		-		23		
Army	712		2,642		-	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		
Navy	40		1,612		544	-		-		-		-		-		-		23		
AF	-		-		-	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		
MC	-		900		-	652		-		-		9,340		-		-		-		
Education																				

FLD	Description Unit SVC	Gas	Diesel Oil	Fuel Oil	Cem.	Grease	TNT	Wood	Medi- cine	Money	Other
		G/L	G/L	G/L	Bag	G/L	LB	m <sup>3</sup>	\$	\$	EA
Agriculture	Sub-T	3,938	22,165	4,571	-	-	-	-	-	-	367
	Army	3,575	7,171	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Navy	325	1,426	4,549	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	AF	42	232	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	MC	-	13,336	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	367
Health & Social	Sub-T	227	735	-	-	-	-	-	4,077	-	31
	Army	72	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Navy	105	650	-	-	-	-	-	4,077	-	-
	AF	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
	MC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
Social Welfare	Sub-T	943	6,051	1,448	109	-	4,000	4,006	16,322	128,887	6
	Army	55	604	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Navy	828	618	198	109	-	4,000	4,006	16,322	128,887	6
	AF	55	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	MC	5	4,376	1,250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source : Ministry of National Defense

## II. RESULTS OF CIVIC ACTION (ARMY)

### A. Land Development (1968)

Field		Result	Mil. Personnel	Vehicle
Road Construction	Pavement	95,100 m		
	Enlargement	17,000 m	421,730	24,093
	Creation	23,260 m		
	Repair	78,660 m		
Banking	Creation	96,472 m	440,870	12,328
	Repair	7,547 m		
Cultivation	Woodland	268 Jungbo	68,806	1,009
	Wasteland	149 "	710	450
	River	133 "	3,060	300
	Hill	31 "	9,681	263
	Farmland	1,475 "	14,513	2,957
	Gumi District	-	8,426	2,025
Others	Channel Const.	Cutting 65m	69,017	2,555
	Riverside Work	1,230 EA	38	19
	School Site Work	12,000Pyung	3,287	2,622

Source : Handbook of Army Civic Support Action (1968)

B. Disaster Restoration (During 1962-1967)

Field	Results	Equipment Supplied
Road Repair	42,376 m	Buldozer: 6,490EA Crane: 2EA
Banking	35,862 m	Trk Dump: 17,039EA Cargo: 27,555EA
Water-Pumping	570 EA	Motor Fire Engine: 33EA Pump: 1,850EA
Agriculture	947 Jungbo	Compressor: 58EA Trailer: 6,852EA
Water-Supply	940 (10k GA)	Grader : 185EA Water Pump : 7,618EA Others : 40,146EA
Total Mil. Personnel : 1,424 186		Total Supplied Equip.: 107,837 EA

Source: Handbook of Army Civic Support Action (1968)

### III. ROK. & US JOINT HIGHWAY PROJECT

#### A. Objective

- (1) Strengthen the belt between civilian and army.
- (2) Contribute to the economical and industrial development of government
- (3) Acquire mobile route

#### B. Background and source

##### (1) Background

- a. Approached to the agreement to plan and perform mutually the road development project in Korea with the support of USOM in 1959.
- b. The initial ROK-US joint highway project EROX Uijongbu to Woonchon was started in 1962.
- c. The joint highway committee was activated as of 1 July 1962. For the effective support of the ROK-US joint highway project. According to the US civic action program for the under-developed nation, which was proposed by president Kennedy in 1962.
- d. ROK Ministry of national defense became a member upon probe vine the support responsibility of some part of local material in 1966.

##### (2) Source

Source of this project, which was replaced recently is as follows; EUSA Policy instruction 5-11(3. July 1968) and civic support plan regulation 530-8 (3 Dec. 1968)

Source : Office of the Chife of Engineers



#### IV. THE RESULTS OF CIVIC SUPPORT ACTION DURING VIETNAM WAR (1965-1967)

Description	Result	Mil. Personnel	Equipment
Road Construction	254 Km	60,101	7,383
Road Repair	784 Km	81,312	14,101
Road Pavement	72 Km	15,734	4,190
Bridge Const.	719 EA	31,918	3,389

Source : Annual Reports of Engineers

#### V. THE RESCUE RESULTS OF THE AIR BY ARMY

Mission	Times	Life Rescued	Incident Case	Remarks
VIP Air Transport	8,000			1968-1981 Air Force
Search & Rescue	305	3,691	Flood  Fire  Colliery Accid.  Traffic Accid.	1958-1981  Air Force : 288 Times 2,406 Pers.  Army Aviation : 17 Times 1,285 Pers
A Remote Place	1,380	5,080		1968-1981 Air Force

Source : Army Aviation School Headquarters of Air Force Brigade

## VI. NAVAL CIVIC ACTION PLAN

### A. Rescue of Sea Disaster

<div> <div>Des.</div> <div>Year</div> </div>	East Sea		West Sea		South Sea		Total	
	Ship	Per.	Ship	Per.	Ship	Per.	Ship	Per.
1969	29	-	22	-	6	-	57	-
1970	22	-	21	-	8	-	51	-
1971	26	-	24	-	11	-	61	-
1972	42	459	21	262	13	144	80	865
1973	15	171	10	59	1	-	26	230
1974	7	67	13	44	3	174	23	285
1975	20	114	13	72	3	2	36	188
1976	84	869	20	91	74	438	178	1,398
1980	2	54	1	30	9	102	12	186

### B. Excavation of Relics in the Seabed

Year	Term	Relics
1976	Nov. 9 - Dec. 3	1,966
1977	Jun. 7 - Jul. 31	4,906
1978	Jun. 18 - Aug. 9	5,046
1979	May 29 - Jul. 21	489
1980	Jun. 5 - Aug. 3	942

Source: Headquarters of Navy, Personnel Staff

# APPENDIX E

## TECHNICAL MANPOWER AND DEVELOPMENT AREA

### I. STATISTICS OF TOTAL COMPLETION OF TRAINING SCHOOL

		(Unit: per)														
Year Des.	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
Officer	9196	9697	13585	12911	12065	12140	9426	8656	7985	8085	8844	8573	8561	9178	2345	
Enlisted Man	14503	58954	58993	57895	60414	59426	49340	38465	42135	55422	52585	47833	45565	49246	18183	
Total	23699	63651	72578	70806	62479	71566	58666	47121	50120	63507	61429	56406	54126	58424	20528	

Source : Micro Film in the Ministry of National Defense

## II. STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF ARMY TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

Year Des.	(unit: per)														
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Officer	8567	8449	11701	10702	10581	9940	7314	6554	6809	7151	7065	7065	7678	8245	1184
Enlisted Man	6251	50142	49754	48957	50758	29528	38283	27634	34732	48290	38301	40319	38281	38107	8915
Total	14818	58591	61455	59659	61339	59468	45602	34188	41541	54798	45452	47384	45959	46352	10099

## III. STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

III. STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL															(unit: per)
Year Des.	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Officer	59	155	52	185	197	247	134	307	184	354	93	88	144	132	22
Enlisted Man	1126	1199	890	979	1070	1097	996	3091	2363	2308	2317	2523	3264	5394	3107
Total	1183	1354	942	1164	1267	1344	1130	3398	2547	2662	2415	2611	3408	5526	3129

#### IV. STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF AIR FORCE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

		(unit:per)													
Year Des.	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Officer	459	877	1498	1727	999	1473	1978	1795	992	1223	1121	1420	739	801	1139
Enlisted Man	5735	5581	6312	6052	6632	5749	9056	7740	5040	4824	5948	4991	4020	5745	6161
Total	6194	6459	7810	7779	7631	7222	11034	9535	6032	6047	7069	6411	4759	6546	7300

#### V. STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF MARINE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

V. STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF MARINE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL															(unit:per)	
Year Des.	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
Officer	113	216	334	297	288	480	-	-	-	-	474	-	-	-	-	
Enlisted Man	1391	2031	2037	1907	1954	3052	900	-	-	-	6091	-	-	-	-	
Total	1504	2247	2371	2204	2242	3532	900	-	-	-	6493	-	-	-	-	



VI. SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CANDIDATES OF THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION EXAM.

Year Des.	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total
Technician I	518 (1,976)	124 (1,907)	249 (1,300)	657 (2,075)	1,283 (3,108)	2,003 (3,760)	4,316 (14,125)
Technician II	518 (17,460)	1,767 (56,410)	2,671 (63,194)	4,715 (94,453)	7,076 (92,522)	5,516 (74,990)	22,236 (399,029)
Assistant Technician	428 (6,357)	2,458 (11,055)	4,067 (12,334)	4,764 (15,867)	4,604 (27,304)	4,069 (26,190)	20,390 (99,110)
Total	946 (25,793)	4,349 (69,372)	6,987 (76,828)	10,136 (112,395)	12,963 (122,934)	11,588 (104,940)	46,969 (512,260)

\* Number in Parenthesis is Total Successful Candidates

Source : M.N.D. M.S.T.

# VII. PLAN OF VOCATIONAL GUIDING EDUCATION & RESULTS (ARMY)

Section Year	Training Troop	Occupation	Period (%)	Trainees Number		Remarks
				Plan	Result (%)	
1968	10	13	12 - 20	562		Cancelled
1969	13	11	6 - 20	658	643 (98)	
1970	12	12	6 - 20	1,382	1,323 (96)	
1971	11	12	6 - 20	1,000	949 (95)	
1972	8	9	8 - 20	"	1,048 (105)	
1973	8	9	12 - 20	"	1,064 (106)	
1974	9	10	"	700	615 (88)	
1975	8	13	"	"	206 (29)	
1976	6	10	"	520	458 (88)	Cancelled
1977	6	9	"	700	682 (97)	
1978	6	10	"	"	755 (108)	
1979	7	9	15 - 20	"	790 (113)	
1980	7	9	"	900		

## APPENDIX F

### MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA

#### I. STATUS ON EDUCATION AND TREATMENT (OCEAN AND UNDERWATER MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER)

<div style="display: inline-block; transform: rotate(-45deg);">Des. Year</div>	Education		Treatment	
	Oceanic-medical Officers	Oceanic-medical Crew	Diving Disease	CO Poisoning
1979	4	-	4	1
1980	8	-	3	-
1981	1	4	1	1

Source : Ocean and Underwater Medical Research Center

#### II. ACOMPLISHMENT OF EDUCATION (THE AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER)

<div style="display: inline-block; transform: rotate(-45deg);">Year Des.</div>	55-75	76	77	78	79	80	81	Total
Aeromedical Officers	531	34	46	72	71	66	51	871
Aeronurce Officers	10	-	-	20	20	10	10	70
Civilian Pilots	1,578	71	70	317	-	-	267	2,407
Others	37	-	-	-	-	58	29	124

Source : The Aeromedical Research Center

### III. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE TRAINING

Year	Officer	N.C.O.	E.M.	Others	Year	Officer	N.C.O.	E.M.	Others
1961	-	-	40	-	1971	-	10	26	5
1962	6	-	79	-	1972	-	-	49	5
1963	6	17	68	4	1973	-	-	78	-
1964	5	11	56	3	1974	-	-	51	-
1965	6	19	71	6	1975	4	5	92	-
1966	6	18	88	1	1976	3	19	44	-
1967	13	20	75	14	1977	2	11	67	16
1968	9	10	51	-	1978	11	-	34	6
1969	-	-	20	-	1979	4	3	51	6
1970	-	20	27	10	1980	3	2	49	3
Total						76	166	1,116	80

\* Medical Equipment Maintenance Units is the unique training institute for this part in Korea.

# APPENDIX G

## GENERAL MANPOWER AREA

### I. MASTER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE EDUCATION

Year	Des.	English	Malay	German	Chinese	Russian	Japanese	Total
1953		326	-	-	-	-	-	326
1954		258	-	-	-	-	-	258
1955		302	-	-	-	-	-	302
1956		439	-	-	-	-	-	439
1957		344	-	-	-	-	-	344
1958		547	-	-	-	-	-	547
1959		290	-	-	-	-	-	290
1960		679	-	-	8	6	-	693
1961		494	-	-	13	11	-	518
1962		415	-	-	11	9	-	435
1963		498	-	-	8	10	-	516
1964		550	-	10	10	10	-	580
1965		567	-	10	9	5	-	591
1966		407	-	9	9	5	-	430
1967		395	-	15	15	5	-	430
1968		528	-	5	14	4	10	561
1969		254	-	5	12	5	10	413
1970		434	19	9	10	4	10	700
1971		554	10	3	10	5	10	732
1972		533	-	-	5	-	5	599
1973		394	-	-	10	-	10	414
1974		181	-	-	10	-	10	201
1975		223	-	-	-	-	-	223
Total		9,612	29	66	154	79	65	10,542

Source : Army Concentrated Administration School



## II. CIVILIAN TRUST EDUCATION

Description	Year																			Total
	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81		
Road Official	192	92	144	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	398	
Police	-	-	23	-	-	-	5	58	-	-	31	-	6	113	-	157	150	40	583	
Civilian Defense Personnel	-	-	-	-	23	60	89	90	89	86	87	30	-	229	198	208	209	-	1,400	
Defense Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	41	15	-	86	
Police Executive	-	-	54	336	-	-	-	-	-	-	103	-	45	-	-	-	-	-	538	
Service in the First Reserve Executive	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	188	898	1501	281	49	648	-	3,615	
Military Instructor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	236	236	240	236	238	218	239	1,643	
Military Instructor (Women's Corps)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	26	40	485	46	42	272	231	211	1,379	
Social Woman Trust Education	-	-	-	-	-	417	87	167	329	52	199	1129	587	460	58	69	-	-	3,554	
General Women Colleger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	453	893	893	-	130	2,369	

Source : School Year Book

### III. TRUST EDUCATION IN THE DOMESTIC CIVILIAN UNIVERSITY

Course Year	Total	Human Science				Natural Science					
		Subtotal	Army	Navy	Airforce	Marine	Subtotal	Army	Navy	Airforce	Marine
1956	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1957	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1958	927	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1,183	1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
614	1960	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
755	1961	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
51	1962	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
63	1963	32	24	-	6	2	31	23	-	8	-
50	1964	38	22	6	6	4	12	3	5	4	-
94	1965	59	39	7	10	3	3	24	6	5	-
49	1966	15	13	-	2	-	34	24	5	5	-
58	1967	23	15	3	5	-	35	27	4	4	-
31	1968	15	11	-	4	-	16	4	6	6	-
24	1969	17	10	5	-	2	7	2	5	-	-
41	1970	19	10	5	4	-	22	4	14	4	-
36	1971	20	14	-	6	-	16	4	10	2	-
30	1972	20	14	-	6	-	30	27	-	3	-
52	1973	20	18	2	-	-	32	18	14	-	-
103	1974	49	34	10	5	-	54	21	24	9	-
78	1975	43	32	2	9	-	35	15	10	10	-
60	1976	35	23	2	10	-	25	7	3	15	-
87	1977	50	42	1	7	-	37	10	10	17	-

\*The data during 1956 and 1962 are not available in detail.

# IV. OCCUPATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER GRADUATES (1980)

Rank	Des.	Administration Management	Emergency Planning	Reserve Army	Technician & Craftsman	Others	Total
Colonel		166	79	10	103	103	461
Lt. Colonel		287	134	54	148	199	822
Major		182	57	103	95	155	592
Captain		39	6	50	51	69	205
Lieutenant		6	-	4	5	2	17
Warrant Officer		22	1	4	72	38	137
Master Sergeant		221	34	25	283	554	1,117
Sergeant First Class		7	1	2	16	-	44
No Reply		1	1	-	-	1	3
Total		931	313	252	763	1,139	3,398

Source : Korea Ex-soldier Association

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